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Abstract 
 
The spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the proliferating East Asian regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) is worrisome. In particular, the complicated web of hub-and-spoke type 
of overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs) can result in high costs for verifying rules of 
origin (RoO). As an alternative policy option to avoid the negative effect of trade deflection, 
customs unions (CUs) should be examined. Most of the theoretical analyses on the formation 
of CUs highlight stronger positive welfare effects compared to FTAs. However, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence to support the second best theory of customs unions. This paper is 
an attempt to fill this gap by applying two methodologies, an ex-ante simulation approach 
and an ex-post econometric approach. We quantitatively estimate the trade effect of CUs and 
FTAs by adopting a Gravity regression analysis. In general, we find that a CU is a superior 
type of RTA to an FTA in terms of creating more intra-union trade. In addition to analyzing 
the trade effects of RTAs according to type, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare and output 
effects of CUs for East Asia (an ASEAN+3 CU and a China-Japan-Korea CU) compared to 
FTAs by applying a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model analysis. The East Asian 
CUs adopt a system of common external tariffs (CET) based on simple-averaged, import-
weighted, consumption-weighted, and minimum rates. Overall, we find that the ASEAN+3 
CU with the minimum CET is the most desirable type of RTA for both East Asian member 
countries and the world economy as a whole. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The second wave of regionalism1 has been spreading over an increasingly global 
world economy. In particular, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been proliferating in 
East Asia since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997. More specifically, overlapping 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have proliferated in the region. 
Some economists worry about the “Noodle Bowl Syndrome” expected from the 
overlapping East Asian RTAs.2 The complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of FTAs can 
result in high costs for verifying rules of origin (RoO). As an alternative policy option to 
avoid the negative effect of trade deflection, customs unions (CUs) should be examined. 
Based on the pioneering works on welfare-improving CUs by Viner (1950) and Kemp and 
Wan (1976), most of theoretical analyses on the formation of CUs highlight stronger positive 
welfare effects compared to FTAs.  
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the second best theory of 
customs unions. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap by applying both a partial equilibrium 
analysis and a general equilibrium analysis.3 More specifically, we will quantitatively 
 
1 See Bhagwati (1993). 
2 For the spaghetti bowl phenomenon, see Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) and 
Panagariya (1999). See Baldwin (2007) for the East Asian version of the spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon. 
3 Most of the quantitative analyses on the trade and welfare effects of RTAs are mainly based 
on two methodologies, an ex-ante simulation approach based on CGE models and an ex-post 
econometric approach based on Gravity equations. The econometric regression analysis is an 
excellent tool to estimate bilateral changes in the volume of trade but it has a limitation to 
measure the welfare and output effects in contrast to the CGE model analysis. See Burfisher, 
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estimate and compare the trade effects of CUs and FTAs by adopting a Gravity regression 
analysis.  
In addition to the analysis of trade effects of RTAs according to type, we will 
quantitatively evaluate the welfare and output effects of CUs for East Asia (an ASEAN+3 CU 
and a China-Japan-Korea CU) compared to FTAs involving the same countries using a global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.4 The quantitative analysis of East Asian CUs 
will adopt a system of common external tariffs (CET) based on simple-averaged, import-
weighted, consumption-weighted, and minimum rates. We will additionally compare the real 
GDP and welfare effects of different CET settings to find the most desirable determination of 
CET for a CU in the region. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II theoretically reviews the economic 
effects of CUs compared to FTAs and empirically tests the superiority of CUs over FTAs 
using Gravity equations. Section III descriptively demonstrates the superiority of CUs to 
FTAs for East Asian countries. Section IV introduces the CGE model, data, and ex-ante 
scenarios. This section quantitatively measures the effects of the proposed East Asian CUs 
with different CET systems in comparison to those of East Asian FTAs. Section V presents 
concluding remarks with policy implications. 
 
 
2. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS VERSUS CUSTOMS UNIONS  
 
 
Robinson and Thierfelder (2004) and Greenaway and Milner (2002) for the methodological 
comparison and evaluation. 
4 Most of the CGE model analyses evaluate either the effects of FTAs or those of CUs 
separately. 
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2.1. Theoretical Review and Empirical Evidence 
 
RTAs have been revitalized since the successful evolution of the European and the 
North American integration in the late 1980s. Quite a few theoretical and empirical studies 
have evaluated the static welfare effects and the dynamic path of RTAs in general.5 However, 
there is a lack of analysis of the trade and welfare effects produced by different types of RTAs. 
Krueger (1995) is a pioneering work on the comparison of different types of RTAs, especially, 
FTAs and CUs. She strongly argues that CUs are “always” better than FTAs by analyzing 
static net welfare gains and dynamic evolutionary paths. The negative opinion of FTAs is 
mainly based on the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the hub-and-spoke type of 
overlapping FTAs. The welfare-reducing trade diversion effect and the high costs of verifying 
RoO may overwhelm the gains from freer trade with FTAs. This additional cost may cause 
larger negative welfare effects in addition to the traditional trade diversion effect and may not 
trigger the domino effect of regionalism6 because of the difficulty in accommodating new 
entrants into the existing RoO regimes. Mirus and Rylska (2001) support Krueger’s (1995) 
argument by carefully describing the costs and the benefits of FTAs and CUs, focusing on 
RoO and CET.  
More rigorously, Panagariya and Findlay (1996) theoretically compare welfare 
effects of FTAs and CUs by adopting a modified Meade model of endogenous external tariff 
protection. They argue that a CU is a less protective and welfare superior form of RTA than 
an FTA. However, similar to Richardson (1994), they identify a possible free-rider problem in 
lobbying for protection that makes a CU less effective than an FTA. 
 
5 See Lee, Park and Shin (2008) for an informative literature survey of recent proliferation of 
RTAs and the evolutionary paths focusing on trade and welfare effects. 
6 See Baldwin (1993) for the domino effect of regionalism. 
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As we mentioned earlier, a significant volume of research has been carried out to 
measure the static net gains from forming RTAs and the dynamic evolution of RTAs toward 
global free trade. However, despite the above-mentioned theoretical analyses, there has been 
little empirical work done to prove the superiority of CUs over FTAs. Ghosh and Yamarik 
(2004) and Magee (2008) are exceptions. Both of those studies apply a Gravity regression 
analysis to measure intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects of different types of RTAs. They 
find that the trade effects are significantly different depending on the RTA type. In particular, 
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) find that a CU in contrast to an FTA raises more intra-bloc trade 
but less extra-bloc trade when they estimate with including proposed RTAs. However, the 
pattern of trade effects are reversed with actual RTAs concerned. Magee (2008) finds that the 
net trade-creating effects of FTAs are greater than CUs but the result is reversed when he 
estimates the cumulative effects with lags because of the strong post-enactment intra-bloc 
trade-creating effect and weak anticipatory trade-diverting effect of CUs. Therefore, it 
remains an open question whether CUs are superior to FTAs in terms of creating more intra-
bloc trade and diverting less extra-bloc trade. We attempt to find an answer in this section by 
adopting a Gravity regression analysis. 
 
2.2. Gravity Regression Analysis: Bilateral Volume of Trade Effects 
 
A. Model Specification 
 
We quantitatively estimate the trade effects of CUs and FTAs by using an extended 
Gravity model of bilateral trade flows. We extend the typical Gravity model with a number of 
extra variables.7 The extended Gravity model has similar specifications to that of Ghosh and 
 
7 Most conventional Gravity models do not distinguish between types of RTAs. In other 
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Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008) in order to measure intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects 
of different types of RTAs.  
In particular, we introduce a dummy variable for the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) to control the indirect trade promoting effects. Rose (2004) finds that the 
GSP has a strong trade effect. Since the increased capabilities of developing countries to trade 
may increase indirectly their trade with other developing countries, we need to control for the 
factors affecting the trade of developing countries. 
The extended Gravity equation is defined as: 
 
ln(Tradeijt) =  α1 ln(G itGDPjt α2 ln(Distij) β’X’ α0 + DP ) +  + 
+ γ0 GSPijt + γ1 FTAijt + γ2 FTAOutijt + γ3 CUijt + γ4 CUOutijt + εijt 
 
where i and j denote particular countries, and t denotes time, 
z Tradeijt denotes the average value of the bilateral trade between i and j at time t,   
z GDP is a real GDP,  
z Distij is the distance between i and j, 
z X is a set of control variables including landlocked, border, common language, 
colony dummy, and area, 
z GSP is the Generalized System of Preferences dummy, 
 
words, they implicitly assume that all RTAs have the same trade effects. In particular, Aitken 
(1973) and Frankel (1993) introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the two 
trading countries are both members of the same RTA and zero otherwise. On the other hand, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Frankel (1997), and Frankel and Wei (1998) add another 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the bilateral trade between an RTA member 
and a nonmember country. 
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z FTAij is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to a free trade agreement, 
z FTAOutij is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to a customs union and j does 
not or vice versa. 
z CUij is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to a customs union, 
z CUOutij is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to a customs union and j does 
not or vice versa, 
The error term εijt is composed of an individual effect δij, the time effect θt and a zero 
mean disturbance uijt, thus εijt = δij +θt +uijt,. 
 
B. Estimation Technique 
 
Trefler (1993) argues that the formation of RTAs is not exogenously determined. If 
the presence or absence of RTAs is endogenously determined, an econometric issue in the 
estimation of trade effects of RTAs incurs an endogeneity problem arising from the 
correlation of an RTA variable with the error term. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that the 
omitted variable bias is the major source of the endogeneity facing the estimation of RTA 
effects in Gravity equations using cross-section data. The standard solutions to address the 
omitted variable bias are using instrumental variables (IV) or Heckman control function. 
Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) attempt to adjust for the endogeneity problem 
using the IV or control function but fail to solve the endogeneity bias. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997) estimate the Gravity model in first differences to correct the problem. 
Haveman and Hummels (1998), however, indicate that the first-differencing method may not 
remove time-varying bias.  
Furthermore, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) show that the omitted variable bias 
is generated if multilateral trade resistance (expressed in price terms) is ignored in the cross-
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sectional Gravity equation. The standard way to account for the multilateral price terms is 
using country-specific fixed effects, as Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) suggest. However, 
recent studies use panel data rather than cross-section data. Thus the country-specific fixed 
effects are not enough to remove the omitted variable bias since the multilateral price terms 
would vary by time. Therefore, the literature suggests alternative methodologies to deal with 
this problem.  
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss the methodologies to adjust the endogeneity 
bias from a theoretical perspective and suggest introducing the time-varying country 
dummies in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. However the fixed effect OLS 
technique ignores unobserved heterogeneity and thus the resulting estimates are likely to be 
biased.8 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) address the panel estimation with country pair fixed 
effects and country-and-time effects. The country pair fixed effects control for unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity and the country-and-time effects account for the time-varying 
multilateral price terms. We use this alternative approach to solve the endogeneity problem.9  
 
C. Data 
 
 
8 For this research, we applied OLS estimations with three different dummies (exporter, 
importer and time dummy, one time-varying country dummy, and two time-varying country 
dummies) and found that there is an unobserved heterogeneity among country pairs. 
Therefore, the biased OLS estimates are not used and reported for our Gravity analysis. 
9 Similarly, Magee (2008) adopts the approach controlling for country-pair, importer-year, 
and exporter-year fixed effects but uses a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator in 
order to include zero trade flows instead of the panel estimation in Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007). 
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The panel data comes from Rose (2004), which covers 186 countries from 1948 to 
1999. Except in Europe, RTAs have been proliferating globally since the 1970s. Thus we 
limit our sample to the period from 1970 to 1999. To control the selection bias, we include as 
many RTAs as possible. Thirty one RTAs that have notified the WTO are included in this 
empirical experiment. The types of RTAs are shown in Table 1.  
 
D. Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the impact of RTAs on intra- and extra-bloc 
memberships in general. As we interpret the random effects with time varying country 
dummies in the first two columns, the conventional variables behave the way the model 
predicts, and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. To summarize briefly, the 
estimated coefficients on bilateral distance, landlocked dummy, and log of area in pairs are 
significantly negative. The estimated coefficients on log of GDP in pairs, land border dummy, 
common language dummy, colony dummy are all significantly positive. This indicates that 
the transaction cost and market size matter in creating more bilateral trade. 
In fact, our interest is in the impact of RTAs broken down by type. In order to control 
for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and the time-varying multilateral price terms, we 
focus on the estimates reported in column 4 of Table 2, that is, the county pair fixed effects 
with time varying country dummies, as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use.10  
 
10 There are two different estimation techniques in the panel setting: random effects and 
fixed effects. The generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is 
performing the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), which compares the fixed to 
random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
other regressors in the model. We conducted the Hausman test and found that the null 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                       
The GSP has a positive trade effect, as we expected, and is statistically significant in 
most cases, except the case with time varying country dummies in column 4. The estimated 
coefficient on the RTA membership dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. 
The estimate on the intra-bloc membership implies that a pair of countries that joins an RTA 
experiences an increase in trade of 18.3 percent, with other variables constant.11 The estimate 
on the extra-bloc dummy variable is also positive and statistically significant. The estimate 
implies that RTA members’ trade with non-members is estimated to rise by 11.0 percent, 
reflecting the strong income effects overwhelming the initial substitution effects. Hence, 
RTAs do create trade among members and do not divert trade from other countries that do not 
belong to the bloc. 
In Table 3, we estimate the trade effects of RTAs by type―FTAs and CUs. All the 
RTAs examined increase both trade between members and trade between members and 
nonmembers. In comparison with FTAs, CUs raise more intra-bloc trade but less extra-bloc 
trade. More specifically, the estimates (0.133 and 0.135 in column 2) on the FTA membership 
dummies imply that a country that joins an FTA experiences an increase in trade of 14.2 
percent with members and 14.5 percent with nonmembers. Similarly, the estimates (0.282 and 
0.057 in column 2) on the CU membership dummies imply that a country that joins a CU 
experiences an increase in trade of 32.6 percent with members and 5.9 percent with 
nonmembers. In sum, RTAs are trade-creating, not trade-diverting. In particular, CUs raise 
more intra-union trade and less extra-union trade as compared to FTAs. 
 
hypothesis is rejected, as Egger (2000) finds evidence for the rejection of random effects in 
the gravity estimation. Therefore, we report here only the results of fixed effects in Tables 3 
and 4. 
11 Since e0.168=1.183, an increase from zero (no membership) to one (membership) in the 
RTA dummy variable raises bilateral trade by 18.3 percent. 
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3. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN EAST ASIA: FTA OR CU? 
 
Regionalism in East Asia: RTAs have proliferated in East Asia since the late 1990s,12 
particularly FTAs. As of September 2008, 26 RTAs have been implemented, 8 RTAs have 
been signed, and more than three dozen RTAs are being negotiated or considered by East 
Asian countries. Among the 26 implemented RTAs considered, 21 are bilateral FTAs.13 The 
1997 East Asian financial crisis, sluggish progress of multilateral efforts under the Doha 
Development Agenda, deepening regional interdependence among the East Asian 
economies,14 and regionalization around the world forced the East Asian countries to shift 
their policy stance from favoring multilateral liberalization to favoring regional trade 
agreements.  
 
Rules of Origin and FTAs: As we mentioned earlier in Section II, however, there is a strong 
negative opinion against regionalism because of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected 
from the hub-and-spoke type of overlapping RTAs, which are very common in East Asian 
 
12 For proliferating RTAs in East Asia, see JETRO (2003), Lu (2003), Kawai (2004), 
Feridhanusetyawan (2005), Lee and Park (2005), Park (2006), Kawai and Wignaraja (2008), 
and ADB (2008). 
13 See Table 1 in Park (2008). 
14 The intra-regional trade share in the region, especially in the case of ASEAN+3, has been 
steadily rising from 29.4 percent in 1990, 37.3 percent in 2000, 38.9 percent in 2005, to 38.3 
percent in 2006. See Kawai (2007). 
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FTAs.15 Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007) estimate the effect of member-specific 
discriminatory trade policies on intra-AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) imports with 15 
different preferential margins and emphasize that the additional administration costs to prove 
origin may exceed the initial cost gain from tariff reduction. In particular, for East Asian 
FTAs, which include members with a relatively wide range of tariff differentials, they argue 
that trade deflection through the use of backdoors is likely to be a more serious problem, 
making it even more complicated to verify RoO. These factors may result in FTAs being 
protectionist in nature rather than movement toward global free trade. 
One more important characteristic of East Asian FTAs we should consider is the 
relatively stronger intra-regional division of labor. Kuroiwa (2006) shows that the local 
content of the East Asian production process has declined. Urata (2006) also finds 
development of an increasing vertical intra-industry trade between East Asian countries. 
There is an increasing intra-regional trade in manufacturing parts and components that is 
closely connected to the supply chain. The intra-regional division of labor in East Asia over 
the numerous locations of production facilities may require even more complicated and strict 
RoO. 
 
East Asian CUs: Salvatore (2007) lists some critical factors that maximize the trade creation 
effect and minimize the trade diversion effect of CUs. Larger union size, higher pre-union 
tariff structure between members, lower pre-union tariff structure between members and 
nonmembers, higher pre-union intra-regional trade, greater substitutability of production 
structures between members and nonmembers, and geographical proximity will all create 
larger trade gains. Applying these criteria, we expect that the East Asian CUs will likely 
 
15 See Lee, Park and Shin (2008), Park (2006), and Kawai (2007). 
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produce positive static and dynamic welfare effects.16 
In addition, Andresen (2004) analyzes the relative extent of integration among East 
Asian countries by calculating intra-regional trade share, especially the increasing intra-
industry trade and the intra-regional trade of parts and components, compared to Europe at 
the time of the completion of its customs union. Based on this analysis, he proposes that the 
East Asian region form a preferential trade agreement such as a free trade area or a customs 
union. In particular, he suggests that an East Asian customs union is a more desirable form of 
RTA, considering the significant external trade relations with large trade blocs like the 
European Union and the U.S.A. more far-reaching integration relative to FTAs will create 
more gains from free trade by enhancing the region’s bargaining power with extra-East Asian 
trading partners. 
More specifically, Plummer (2006) strongly suggests that ASEAN countries move 
toward the formation of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). He argues that the evolution 
toward an ASEAN customs union (ACU) will make the region more successful by creating 
an ASEAN single market. This will have large trade benefits for the region, as well as 
attracting more foreign direct investment and preventing the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. 
The formation of an ACU will also improve ASEAN’s bargaining power at international 
forums and raise economic efficiency by reinforcing the reform programs of the members. 
In sum, considering the above-mentioned regional characteristics and external 
relations, harmonizing commercial policy among the regional members and nonmembers is 
preferable. Both the additional costs of complicated RoO regimes and the necessity of 
communication between members under FTAs suggest that a more desirable type of RTA for 
East Asian countries is a CU. 
 
 
16 See Lee and Park (2005). 
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4. EAST ASIAN RTAs: A CGE MODEL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Model and Data 
 
In order to search for a more desirable type of RTA in East Asia, we attempt to 
quantitatively assess the effects of different types of RTAs by adopting a CGE model analysis. 
In particular, we employ the commonly used GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model as 
our basic model. This is a standard general equilibrium model that has been extensively used 
in studies to examine a wide range of trade policy issues.17 The adopted GTAP model 
assumes constant returns to scale technology, perfect competition, and a global bank designed 
to achieve a balance between world savings and investment. The three production factors 
(land, labor, and capital) are assumed to be mobile across sectors within a country but not 
mobile across borders. Aggregate household expenditure is determined as a constant share of 
total regional income. The household maximizes utility subject to its expenditure constraints. 
The constant difference of elasticities (CDE) consumer demand system is designed to capture 
differential price and income responsiveness across countries. International trade is linked 
through Armington substitution. Product differentiation between imports by region of origin 
allows for two-way trade across regions in each tradable product. 
We work with a multi-sector and multi-region CGE model of the world economy.18 
 
17 For more detailed information about the GTAP model, see Hertel (1997) and visit 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp 
18 For the sectoral and regional classification, we simply divide the world economy into 10 
sectors and 5 regions because the main objective of this research is to compare the relative 
effectiveness of CUs to FTAs instead of analyzing the effects of a particular RTA on both 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                       
The CGE model is calibrated using the GTAP database Version 6, which represents the world 
economy in the year 2001.19 We do a comparative static analysis of the welfare and GDP 
effects on the regional economies considered before and after changes in trade regimes. 
 
4.2. Scenarios 
 
A. Regional Trade Agreements 
 
In order to quantitatively compare the welfare and GDP effects of different types of 
East Asian RTAs on each of the member countries, members as a whole, nonmembers, and 
the world economy, we consider a Northeast Asian RTA that competes with the existing 
Southeast Asian RTA (AFTA) and an East Asian RTA with which both regions are 
cooperating. The following four RTA scenarios will be empirically examined: 
 
z CJK FTA: An FTA between China, Japan, and Korea 
z ASEAN+3 FTA: An FTA between ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea 
z CJK CU: A CU between China, Japan, and Korea 
z ASEAN+3 CU: A CU between ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea 
 
 
participating and non-participating economies. The 10 sectors are: 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing, Beverage, Textile and Clothing, Chemical Product, Metal 
Product, Transport Equipment, Electronic Product, Machine, Other Manufacturing, and 
Services. The 5 regions are ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, and the Rest of the World. 
19 See Dimaranan and McDougall (2006) for the database. 
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For each of the scenarios, both import tariffs and export taxes between members will be 
eliminated, but the trade barriers between members and nonmembers will be retained.  
 
B. Common External Tariffs 
 
A CU imposes a CET on importables from nonmembers. According to the applied 
assumptions for the determination of the CET, the structure of a CU is very different. Since 
Viner (1950) and Kemp and Wan (1976) proved the existence of welfare-improving CUs with 
CET and a system of lump-sum compensatory payment, some theoretical analyses on the 
determination of CET have been done. Bhagwati (1991) proposes that a CU should set its 
CET at the minimum of the pre-union members’ import tariffs to satisfy GATT Article XXIV. 
However, Srinivasan (1997) and Krueger (1995) suggest that the CET should be maintained 
at the pre-union average level. Syropoulos (2003) builds a model for the endogenous 
relationship between distribution rules of tariff revenues between CU members and the 
determination of CET preferences with special attention to factor abundance. He finds that 
CET should be set at the most-preferred tariff of the member with the median capital/labor 
ratio. Moreover, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001) quantitatively estimate effects of the 
harmonized NAFTA (North American FTA) with three different vectors of CET: simple 
arithmetic average, import-weighted average, and production-weighted average, assuming 
NAFTA evolves into a CU by using the Michigan CGE model. They find that the effects of 
the theoretical North American CU will heavily depend on the CET measures implemented. 
We consider the following four sets of CET rates for the proposed East Asian 
RTAs20: 
 
20 Unlike the free riding effort of lobbying for protection in Panagariya and Findlay (1996) 
and Richardson (1994) as we mentioned in the Section 2.1, if the lobbying effort becomes 
 z Simple average of members’ import tariffs against nonmembers; 
z Import-weighted average of members’ import tariffs against nonmembers;  
z Consumption-weighted average of members’ import tariffs against nonmembers; 
z Minimum import tariffs against nonmembers among members 
 
17 
 
ij
Using the trade barriers ( ) presented in the GTAP database, we calculate the common 
external tariffs under above-mentioned four alternative measures. The weighted-averaged 
CETs are calculated as  where  is the import (or consumption) share of 
country 
ijtf
CETi ij
j
s tf=∑ ijs
j  (ASEAN+3 or China, Japan and Korea) in industry .  i
The calculated CET of the CJK CU and the ASEAN+3 CU are shown in Table 4. We 
find some interesting characteristics from the calculated CET of the East Asian CUs. First, 
there is a great deal of variance in the CETs, especially, in primary and labor-intensive 
products such as Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing, Beverage, and Textile and Clothing. In 
particular, the tariff for Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing is highly affected by which measure is 
used in the calculation of the CET. For example, in the case of the ASEAN+3 CU, if the CET 
rate is calculated by the import-weighted average, then it amounts to 12.99 percent. However, 
if the CET rate is determined by the minimum, this rate is only 1.30 percent. Second, 
                                                                                                                                        
very successful, a CU may raise the CET and make the CU more protective than an FTA. In 
order to analyze the case, we may include one more CET system into our simulation analysis, 
for example, maximum external tariffs against nonmembers among members. It is 
hypothetically possible but it is not a realistic scenario considering GATT Article XXIV. 
However, we examined (but not reported) the case and found that the welfare effects of the 
CUs are worse than those of the corresponding FTAs. 
18 
 
                                           
following the case of minimum CET rate, the CET estimated by consumption-weighted 
average is lowest and mostly balanced on average and the import-weighted average CET is 
the highest and mostly unbalanced on average. Third, as we compare the CJK CU with the 
ASEAN+3 CU, the ASEAN+3 CU has a relatively higher and wider CET system for 
nonmembers. This is reasonable if we consider the significant gaps in development levels of 
member countries in the ASEAN+3 CU. 
  
4.3. Simulation Results21 
 
A. Welfare and Output Effects 
 
Table 5 presents the impacts of East Asian RTAs on real GDP and welfare. The 
positive effects of a CU on members outweigh those of an FTA.22 For instance, the member’s 
 
21 Country-specific effects are not reported because the main objective of this research is to 
compare the effectiveness of different types of RTAs for members, nonmembers, and the 
world as a whole. However, for the most desirable type of RTA, we will report the country-
specific effects as a reference in Tables 6 and 7.  
22 We would like to acknowledge that the CGE model analysis examined in this paper 
focused more on the benefit side of the trade liberalization. The additional verifying costs of 
origins are not included in its estimation of trade costs. It will overestimate the gains from the 
formation of the East Asian FTAs. It can be a reason why the additional gains from the 
formation of the proposed East Asian CUs are not significantly large compared with 
corresponding FTA’s. We also acknowledge some limitations of this research. In particular, 
we may need to perform usual sensitivity tests for the CGE model analysis with different 
macro-closure rules and parameter values for more robust results. The specification of both 
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welfare from an ASEAN+3 CU increases by 0.63 percent on average, while that from an 
ASEAN+3 FTA increases by 0.52 percent. Furthermore, the global gains from a CU are 
larger than those from an FTA. As we compare the relative size of the effect of a CU to 
corresponding FTA, the real GDP gains from CUs are larger by 19 percent in the case of 
ASEAN+3 and 25 percent in the case of CJK on average and the welfare gains from CUs are 
larger by 25 percent in the case of ASEAN+3 and 6 percent in the case of CJK on average.  
In Table 5, we note that the formation of a CU in East Asia has insignificant effects 
on nonmembers in terms of real GDP. However, the impact on nonmembers’ welfare is 
somewhat different. When the minimum tariffs are adopted as the common external tariffs of 
a CU, the nonmembers experience the largest decline in the welfare. This is because the 
worsened terms of trade effect exceeds the efficiency effect.  
Let us turn to a discussion of the impact of CET measures. There is no difference 
between the real GDP and welfare effects of FTAs and CUs with an import-weighted CET 
system. For the ASEAN+3 CU, the real GDP for members increases by 0.27 percent for the 
minimum tariffs, while it ranges from 0.23 percent to 0.25 percent for the alternative CET 
system. With the minimum tariffs, the largest global welfare is also induced. The adoption of 
minimum CET rates may be an appropriate choice for the maximization of members’ welfare 
as well as world welfare. These results imply that a CU with the minimum CET is the 
optimum RTA strategy for East Asian countries.  
 
B. Country-specific Effects of the ASEAN+3 CU 
 
the Gravity and CGE model could be diversified and tested for dynamic effects. This paper, 
however, is not an exhaustive study of economic modeling but, rather, is an empirical 
investigation to compare the relative performance of types of RTAs. Thus, we leave these 
additional concerns as future research agenda. 
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Table 6 summarizes the likely impacts of the most desirable East Asian RTA, an 
ASEAN+3 CU, on each member’s economy. In terms of welfare and real GDP, Korea as the 
smallest country has the largest gains from freer trade, and Japan as the most advanced and 
liberalized country in terms of import tariffs has the smallest gains. The ASEAN’s gains are 
larger than China’s. The ASEAN+3 CU raises intra-regional trade from a minimum of 4.24 
percent for ASEAN to a maximum of 19.03 percent for China. 
The effect of the ASEAN+3 CU on output production by sector is summarized in 
Table 7. East Asian regional integration restructures the regional industrial structure based on 
each economy’s comparative advantages. ASEAN’s and China’s primary industries, Japan’s 
advanced manufacturing industries, and Korea’s light manufacturing industries will achieve 
more gains.23  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In order to support the second best theory of customs union, we quantitatively 
estimated the trade effect of CUs and FTAs by using a Gravity regression analysis and found 
that CUs raise more intra-union trade and less extra-union trade compared to FTAs. 
For the East Asian case (both for the China-Japan-Korea RTAs and the ASEAN+3 
RTAs), we quantitatively evaluated the welfare and output effects of CUs compared to FTAs 
by applying a CGE model analysis. From our experiments, we found that (i) the effects of the 
proposed East Asian CUs heavily depend on the CET measures applied; (ii) the East Asian 
 
23 The more disaggregated sectoral classification will provide more precise sector-specific 
and country-specific effects which are not a main objective of this paper. 
21 
 
CUs, especially with the minimum CET rates, generate significant net trade-creating effects 
but worse nonmembers’ welfare; (iii) both positive welfare and real GDP effects of the East 
Asian CUs on members outweigh those of the East Asian FTAs; (iv) the global welfare and 
output gains from the East Asian CUs are larger than those from the East Asian FTAs; and (v) 
an ASEAN+3 CU with the minimum CET is the most desirable type of RTA for both the East 
Asian member countries and the world economy as a whole. 
22 
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Table 1. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) by Type 
 
FTA CU 
1. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
2. The Australia New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (ANZCERTA) 
3. Canada-Chile 
4. Canada-Israel 
5. Chile-Mexico 
6. Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) 
7. Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) 
8. Costa Rica-Mexico 
9. European Communities (EC)-Iceland
10. EC-Norway 
11. EC-Switzerland 
12. EC-Syria 
13. EC-Tunisia 
14. European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) 
15. EFTA-Israel 
16. EFTA-Moroco 
17. EFTA-Turkey 
18. Mexico-Nicaragua 
19. North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) 
20. Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 
21. New Guinea - Australia Trade and 
Commercial Relations Agreement 
(PATCRA) 
22. Papua South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SPARTECA) 
23. Turkey-Israel 
24. USA-Israel 
1. Central American Common Market 
(CACM) 
2. Andean Community (CAN) 
3. Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) 
4. Economic and Monetary Community 
of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
5. EC 
6. EC-Turkey 
7. Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) 
 
Table 2. Effects of RTAs on Trade Flows 
 
 
Country pair random effects Country pair fixed effect 
Time dummy
(1) 
Time varying 
country 
dummies 
(2) 
Time dummy 
(3) 
Time varying 
country 
dummies 
(4) 
ln(GDPiGDPj) 
0.851 
(0.006)*** 
0.865 
(0.007)*** 
0.525 
(0.009)*** 
0.587 
(0.009)*** 
ln( )ijdist  
-1.349 
(0.026)*** 
-1.404 
(0.026)***   
Landlocked -0.613 (0.035)*** 
-0.490 
(0.036)***   
Border 0.734 (0.136)*** 
0.744 
(0.135)***   
Common language 0.342 (0.050)*** 
0.395 
(0.050)***   
ln(AreaiAreaj) 
-0.069 
(0.006)*** 
-0.074 
(0.006)***   
Colony 2.212 (0.177)*** 
1.876 
(0.175)***   
GSP 0.264 (0.018)*** 
0.211 
(0.019)*** 
0.052 
(0.194)*** 
0.027 
(0.020) 
ijRTA  
0.421 
(0.035)*** 
0.258 
(0.036)*** 
0.281 
(0.036)*** 
0.168 
(0.036)*** 
RTAOutij 
0.154 
(0.013)*** 
0.074 
(0.013)*** 
0.137 
(0.013)*** 
0.104 
(0.013)*** 
No. observations 188,065 188,065 188,065 188,065 
R-sq 0.61 0.62 0.49 0.50 
F-test (Ho: 0ijδ = )   24.60 
(p-value: 0.00) 
24.51 
(p-value: 0.00)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept is included but not reported. *, **, 
and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
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Table 3. Effects of RTAs by Type on Trade Flows: FTAs vs CUs 
 
 Country pair fixed effect Time dummy (1) Time varying country dummies (2) 
ijFTA  
0.237 
(0.045)*** 
0.133 
(0.046)*** 
FTAOutij 
0.163 
(0.012)*** 
0.135 
(0.012)*** 
ijCU  
0.396 
(0.057)*** 
0.282 
(0.058)*** 
CUOutij 
0.064 
(0.017)*** 
0.057 
(0.018)*** 
No. observations 188,065 188,065 
R-sq 0.49 0.50 
F-test(Ho: 0ijδ = ) 24.37 (p-value:0.00) 
24 .31 
(p-value:0.00) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept, ln(GDPiGDPj), and GSP are 
included but not reported. *, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. Common External Tariffs of the East Asian CUs 
 
CJK CU 
  Simple Average
Import-
weighted 
Average
Consumption-
weighted 
Average 
Minimum Mean Standard Deviation
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 6.50 8.28  6.81  1.30  5.72  3.05  
Beverage 11.13 8.95  9.72  6.60  9.10  1.90  
Textile and Clothing 12.00 13.47 10.52  8.40  11.10 2.16  
Chemical Product 5.13 4.90  4.72  4.30  4.76  0.35  
Metal Product 4.97 4.93  4.98  4.60  4.87  0.18  
Transport equipment 6.70 6.79  6.34  4.60  6.11  1.02  
Electronic Product 1.60 1.56  1.53  1.40  1.52  0.09  
Machine 3.77 3.22  3.28  3.00  3.32  0.32  
Other Manufacturing 4.53 4.90  3.70  2.80  3.98  0.93  
Mean 6.26 6.33  5.73  4.11  5.61  1.03  
Standard Deviation 3.37 3.54  2.95  2.33  2.92    
ASEAN+3 CU 
  Simple Average
Import-
weighted 
Average
Consumption-
weighted 
Average 
Minimum Mean Standard Deviation
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 8.63 12.99 8.09  1.30  7.75  4.83  
Beverage 10.75 9.37  9.70  6.60  9.11  1.77  
Textile and Clothing 12.30 13.39 10.82  8.40  11.23 2.16  
Chemical Product 5.13 4.96  4.78  4.30  4.79  0.36  
Metal Product 4.85 4.86  4.94  4.50  4.79  0.20  
Transport equipment 5.80 6.49  5.86  3.10  5.31  1.51  
Electronic Product 1.48 1.37  1.49  1.10  1.36  0.18  
Machine 3.60 3.20  3.25  3.00  3.26  0.25  
Other Manufacturing 4.85 5.10  3.99  2.80  4.19  1.04  
Mean 6.57 7.08  6.12  4.04  5.95  1.33  
Standard Deviation 3.68 4.43  3.20  2.51  3.22    
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Table 5. Welfare and Real GDP Effects of East Asian RTAs 
(% Deviations from the base) 
 
Actual Effects 
CJK ASEAN+3 
Real 
GDP Welfare
Real 
GDP Welfare
FTA 
Members 0.21 0.45 0.23 0.52 
Nonmembers -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 
World 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
CU (Average of the 4 
Measures) 
Members 0.23 0.52 0.25 0.63 
Nonmembers -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 
World 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Simple Average 
Members 0.22 0.47 0.24 0.57 
Nonmembers -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 
World 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Import-weighted Average 
Members 0.21 0.46 0.23 0.52 
Nonmembers -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 
World 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Consumption-weighted Average 
Members 0.23 0.52 0.25 0.61 
Nonmembers 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 
World 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Minimum 
Members 0.25 0.63 0.27 0.80 
Nonmembers 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.12 
World 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Ratio to FTA 
CJK ASEAN+3 
Real 
GDP Welfare
Real 
GDP Welfare
CU (Average of the 4 
Measures) 
Members 1.08 1.16 1.08 1.20 
Nonmembers 0.50 1.08 0.00 1.16 
World 1.25 1.06 1.19 1.25 
Simple Average 
Members 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.10 
Nonmembers 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
World 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.25 
Import-weighted Average 
Members 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 
Nonmembers 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
World 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Consumption-weighted Average 
Members 1.10 1.16 1.09 1.17 
Nonmembers 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.13 
World 1.33 1.00 1.25 1.25 
Minimum 
Members 1.19 1.40 1.17 1.54 
Nonmembers 0.00 1.33 -1.00 1.50 
World 1.33 1.25 1.50 1.50 
Table 6. Effects of an ASEAN+3 CU with Minimum CET Rates 
(% Deviations from the Base) 
 
 
 
ASEAN China Japan Korea 
Welfare 1.64 0.70 0.32 4.06 
Real GDP 0.30 0.21 0.03 2.71 
Trade 4.24 19.03 7.02 11.04 
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Table 7. Effects of an ASEAN+3 CU with Minimum CET Rates 
on Sectoral Output (% Deviations from the Base) 
 
 ASEAN China Japan Korea 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 3.38 5.40 -3.28 -14.75 
Beverage 3.21 0.64 -0.54 10.66 
Textile and Clothing 8.21 3.57 4.46 22.22 
Chemical Product -0.89 -5.31 -0.02 20.66 
Metal Product -8.61 -6.58 0.87 -8.08 
Transport Equipment -8.84 -3.90 5.51 2.50 
Electronic Product -3.37 3.76 -2.72 -16.42 
Machine 0.80 -6.62 -0.90 -14.51 
Other Manufacturing 1.93 -2.16 -1.14 3.89 
Services -0.89 -0.49 0.04 0.87 
 
